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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1277 
 ___________ 
 
 MIGUEL ANGEL CABRERA-OZORIA, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A035-362-405) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 5, 2011 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  July 8, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Miguel Angel Cabrera-Ozoria petitions for review of a final order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of his removal order.  For the reasons 
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discussed below, we will deny the petition for review.  
 Cabrera-Ozoria is a citizen of the Dominican Republic.  He was admitted to the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1978.  Soon thereafter, he enlisted in the 
United States military, and was eventually honorably discharged.  In 1996, he filed an 
application for naturalization, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service denied.  
Then, in 2001, he was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts for a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Cabrera-Ozoria 
pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 216 months‟ imprisonment. 
 As a result of this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated 
removal proceedings against Cabrera-Ozoria, contending that he was removable because, 
among other things, he had been convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Cabrera-Ozoria presented two defenses:  (1) his crime did not 
qualify as an aggravated felony; and (2) as a result of his military service he had become 
a naturalized United States citizen.  An Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected Cabrera-Ozoria‟s 
arguments and found him removable.  Cabrera-Ozoria appealed this decision to the BIA, 
which dismissed his appeal.  He then filed a petition for review with this Court.  
As an initial matter, the government argues that Cabrera-Ozoria‟s petition for 
review was untimely and should therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  His 
petition for review was due within 30 days of the final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(1) — that is, by January 20, 2011— but did not reach this Court until January 
28, 2011.  However, Cabrera-Ozoria submitted his petition to prison authorities one day 
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before the deadline, on January 19, 2011.  Thus, if the prison-mailbox rule applies, 
Cabrera-Ozoria‟s petition for review was timely. 
The government relies on Guirguis v. INS, 993 F.2d 508, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1993), 
where the Fifth Circuit concluded that the prison-mailbox rule does not apply to petitions 
for review in immigration cases.  The Guirguis court reached this conclusion through 
close analysis of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; it observed that Rules 3 and 
4, which govern filing in district courts, were amenable to the prison-mailbox rule, while 
Rules 15 and 25, which govern filing in the courts of appeals, were not.  See id. at 510.   
However, after Guirguis was issued, Rule 25 was amended to include a provision 
concerning inmate filing, which states, “[a] paper filed by an inmate confined in an 
institution is timely if deposited in the institution‟s internal mailing system on or before 
the last day of filing.”  Rule 25(a)(2)(C).  The Fifth Circuit, in dicta, has noted that this 
amendment has “superseded” the rule of Guirguis.  See Smith v. Conner, 250 F.3d 277, 
279 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001).  Moreover, the Second Circuit has relied on this amendment to 
conclude that the prison-mailbox rule does apply to petitions for review.  See Arango-
Aradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 612 (2d Cir. 1994).  We agree with these courts that the 
prison-mailbox rule is available to inmates who file petitions for review of final removal 
orders.  Accordingly, since Cabrera-Ozoria deposited his petition for review in the 
prison‟s internal mailing system in compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(C) within 
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the limitations period, the petition was timely filed.1 
Our jurisdiction to review Cabrera-Ozoria‟s petition is, however, limited.  
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final 
order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a 
criminal offense covered in section . . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),” namely, an aggravated felony.  
Nevertheless, “we have always had jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction by 
engaging in an analysis of whether an alien was convicted of a non-reviewable 
aggravated felony.”  Stubbs v. Att‟y Gen., 452 F.3d 251, 253 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).  We also 
retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). 
Cabrera-Ozoria argues that the BIA, in determining that his conviction under 21 
U.S.C. § 846 qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 
misapplied the categorical approach set forth by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).  Although 
his argument is not entirely clear, he appears to contend that the BIA was permitted to 
consider only the language of 21 U.S.C. § 846,2 and that the statutory language alone 
does not establish that his crime was an aggravated felony.   
                                                 
1  We therefore deny the government‟s motion to dismiss the appeal.  
2  Section 846 provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to 
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as 
those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt 
or conspiracy.” 
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We are not persuaded by Cabrera-Ozoria‟s argument.  Conspiracy to commit an 
aggravated felony is itself an aggravated felony.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).  We 
therefore must consider whether the substantive crime that was the object of the 
conspiracy qualifies as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43).  See Tran v. Gonzales, 
414 F.3d 464, 468 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144, 152-
53 (2d Cir. 2004).  And to identify the object of the conspiracy, we may look to the 
indictment.  See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 
2006). 
Here, the indictment charged Cabrera-Ozoria with conspiracy to possess and 
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
841(b)(1)(A)(ii), 846.  This substantive offense — possession and distribution of more 
than five kilograms of cocaine — unquestionably qualifies as an aggravated felony.  
Section 1101(a)(43)(B) defines “aggravated felony” to include “a drug trafficking crime 
(as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”  Section 924(c)(2), in turn, defines a “drug 
trafficking crime” to include “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act 
(21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).”  Moreover, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) “defines as 
„felonies‟ . . . those crimes to which it assigns a punishment exceeding one year‟s 
imprisonment.”  See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 56 n.7 (2006).  Thus, a conviction 
will qualify as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(B) if it is for a crime that is 
punishable under the CSA and for which more than one year‟s imprisonment may be 
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imposed.  The object of Cabrera-Ozoria‟s conspiracy meets these requirements:  § 841 is 
part of the CSA and prescribes a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, see 
§ 842(b)(1)(A).  Accordingly, we agree with the BIA that Cabrera-Ozoria was convicted 
of an aggravated felony. 
We observe that on appeal, Cabrera-Ozoria has not renewed his argument that he 
became a citizen on account of his service in the military.3  He does argue that he is 
eligible to apply for naturalization.  However, even assuming that Cabrera-Ozoria is 
correct on this legal issue (which is questionable, given his aggravated-felony conviction, 
see, e.g., O‟Sullivan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 453 F.3d 809, 812 (7th 
Cir. 2006)), he remains removable.  See, e.g., Zegrean v. Att‟y Gen., 602 F.3d 273, 274-
75 (3d Cir. 2010).   
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
3  Any such argument would fail.  We have held that one must complete the 
process of becoming a naturalized citizen to be deemed a United States national.  See 
Salim v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 307, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2003). 
